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ABSTRACT 
 
Focusing on China, a country pushing toward a more market-oriented system at warped speed, we 
suggest that previous models of technology adoption and/or diffusion may not be suitable for 
countries migrating from centralized control.  We support the work of Au and Yeung (2007), who 
suggest that China may suffer from a risk avoidance attitude at the firm level based on previous 
attitudes of “control.”  Relying on the literature and supported by an in-depth analysis of the 
Chinese machine tool industry we extend the work of Caselli and Coleman (2001, 2002) and 
advance an expanded model of technology adoption specific to emerging markets, such as China, 
experiencing a transformation from centrally controlled economy toward a market one.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he technical efficiency of a nation has long been associated with a growing sustainable economy.  
Most strong economies (high income) focus attention on research and development while weaker 
(low income) countries find efficiency gains by adopting technologies developed by stronger, 
technologically savvy countries (Caselli and Coleman, 2001).  Yet, little is known about the 
determinants of technology adoption, nor is it clear if those determinants are common to all 
countries, and, specifically countries transitioning from a centrally planned economy, with strong central or 
segmented control, to a market-oriented system.  One stream of research on technology diffusion points to the 
proliferation of information sharing at the firm level for successful adoption (Stoneman and Toivanen, 1997; 
Stoneman, 2002), , while others argue government level influences and incentives are necessary determinants of 
adoption (Cusumano and Elenkov,1994; Chen, 1995).  Based on these bodies of work and their own in-depth field 
research Caselli and Coleman (2001) advanced a model of technology adoption typical of market oriented 
economies. 
 
In this research we focus on China, a country pushing toward a more market-oriented system at a rapid 
pace, and suggest that previous models of technology adoption and/or diffusion may not be suitable for countries 
migrating from centralized control.  We support the work of Au and Yeung (2007), who suggest that countries, and 
in particular China, may suffer from a risk avoidance attitude at the firm level based on previously encouraged 
attitudes of “control.”  Based on the literature and supported by an in-depth analysis of the Chinese machine tool 
industry, a dominant industry in China, we extend the work of Caselli and Coleman (2001, 2002) and advance an 
expanded model of technology adoption specific to markets, such as China, experiencing a transformation toward a 
market economy. 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION:  THEORIES OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
 
Theories of technology adoption have been characterized by how potential adopters process or gain access 
to information (Sarkar, 1998).  Specifically, previous work suggests that it is the ability to gain this access that 
motivates the advancement of technology within a county.  Using the early work of Shumpeter (1942) as a 
foundation, later empirical studies of technology diffusion patterns focused on information asymmetries and 
T 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2011 Volume 27, Number 4 
80 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
resource requirements (Griliches,1957; Mansfield,1975), examples of which included studies of mobile telephony 
(Massini, 2004), of process innovations (Baptista, 1999), and of multiple design and manufacturing technologies 
(Stoneman and Toivanen, 1997; Stoneman, 2002).  Each study hinged on the notion that information sharing makes 
technology adoption “contagious” thus explaining its proliferation.  Cusumano and Elenkov (1994), and later Chen 
(1995) argued that governmental influences were often pivotal determinants of technology adoption patterns, 
suggesting that firm level technology adoption would increase with greater government incentives. 
 
 Caselli and Coleman (2001) conducted a muli-year empirical study of computer adoption in search of 
specific determinants of technology adoption.  Equipped with the knowledge gained through their field research they 
advanced a general model of technology adoption.  To accomplish this, they were required to make initial 
assumptions.  Specifically, they assumed a roughly symmetric macro-environmental context and perfect 
competition.  They suggested that technology adoption decisions would be a function of the abundance of either 
skilled or less-skilled labor within the subject economy.  This assumption was confirmed by their adoption of the 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution production function advanced by Krusell et al (2000).  Using extensive data 
gleaned from the computer industry, they identified determinants of technology adoption using the following model 
specification: 
 
 
 
 
 
where 
it
cI  is computer imports worker (in current U.S. dollars) in country i and year t . X
it
 is
 
the set of explanatory 
variables, δt is a set of year dummies, ηi is a country effect and uit is independently and identically distributed among 
countries and years.  Each of the variables included in the vector X
it 
 were measured by Caselli and Coleman 
annually.  The vector X
it 
 was expected to be orthogonal to ηi  to clearly distinguish random from fixed effects.  The 
vector was treated as exogenous for I.   
 
Caselli and Coleman’s results suggested a negative role for the size of government, indicating government 
control impeded adoption, a finding contrary to Cusumano and Elenkov (1994).  On the other hand, they found that 
the government’s openness to imports was a positive determinant.  At the firm level, both human capital (skilled or 
non-skill labor), and educational attainment were found to be significant determinants of technology adoption.  In 
addition, they found evidence that computer adoption was enhanced by good property-rights protection and high 
rates of investment per worker.  
 
Looking specifically at Chinese manufacturers, Au and Yeung (2007) took a behavioral perspective in their 
model of technology adoption by combining the approaches of two well know antecedents.  Their International 
Model for Technology Adoption (IMTA) is built upon Ajzen (1985; 1991)’s Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and 
Davis et al. (1989)’s Technology Acceptance Model (TAM).  TPB suggests that any given action is determined by 
an attitude which is, in turn, a function of perceived behavioral control, attitude toward behavior and subjective 
norms.  Specifically, Ajzen (1985;1991) contends any given action is a contingent on an individual’s belief 
regarding the difficulty of adopting a given behavior (perceived behavioral control), an individual’s general feeling, 
toward the acceptability or unacceptability of a given behavior (attitude), an individual’s perceptions of how referent 
others (e.g., society, co-workers, family, friends) will respond to a given behavior (subjective norms) . 
 
TAM, an adaptation of Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action (TRA) to the information 
technology field identifies perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use as key determinants of attitude towards 
use of technology (Davis et al., 1989).  Specifically, TAM suggests that an individual’s intention to use a system is 
directly correlated with the perceived ease of use.  Consequently IMTA suggests that controlled attitudes (such as 
centralized decision-making) would generally inhibit the adoption of new technologies.  Au and Yeung (2007) 
further suggest that Chinese manufacturers may be particularly susceptible to risk avoiding behavior.  This same 
argument can be applied to any formerly planned economy such as the former Soviet Union (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1982).   
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Au and Yeung’s (2007) conclusion that formerly planned economies, and particularly China, may have 
other impediments to technology adoption at the firm level raises questions as to the generalizability of Caselli and 
Coleman’s (2001) model of technology adoption and to its specific application to the Chinese context.  Thus, we 
looked for further evidence.  Taking the lead from Caselli and Coleman (2001) .we conducted a thorough field study 
of the Chinese machine tool industry in an attempt to confirm or deny Au and Yeung’s (2007) belief that additional 
determinants of technology diffusion and adoption existed at the firm level in China. (A full account of the field 
research can be found in Appendix A.).  
 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Our research involved extensive field studies of a very large machine tool firm located in the heart of 
Beijing.  Beijing No.1 Machine Tool Plant (BYJC) is a large computer numerical control (CNC) machine tool 
manufacturing firm in China.  Since the firm was founded in June, 1949, it has provided its customers with over 
100,000 milling machines in over 450 varieties, including small and medium-sized, heavy-duty and super-heavy-
duty milling machines.  The firm is ISO 9001 certified, employs engineers and technicians and occupies an area of 
710,000 square meters that includes a building area of 430,000 square meters in the capital of China.  Its production 
facility includes a modern 4000-square-meter air-conditioned assembly workshop, a 2000-square-meter Flexible 
Manufacturing System (FMS) workshop, advanced machining equipment along with precision measuring 
instrumentation, and a high-rack storehouse with 4896 storage positions.   
 
Products 
 
The main products produced by BYJC are CNC milling machines, CNC lathes, vertical machining centers, 
horizontal machining centers and CNC plano-type milling & boring machines.  In addition, 20,000 geological rigs in 
more than 20 varieties have been manufactured and sold over the past ten years.  Products bearing the "Beiyi" brand 
enjoy a good reputation and are in use in over 50 countries.  The recent establishment of an advanced information 
system on their computer network has contributed to optimization of the enterprise's resources.   BYJC designs and 
manufactures small and medium-sized, heavy-duty and super-heavy-duty numerical control (NC) and computer 
numerical control (CNC) plano-type milling and machines, machining center, bed-type milling machines, knee-type 
milling machines, CNC lathes, special purpose milling machines etc.  The products are used in metallurgy, mining, 
railway, power generation, aerospace and aircraft and mold manufacturing.  The plant also produces geological rigs 
that are widely used in mine prospecting and development of water resources. 
 
Services  
 
Founded in 1988, a subsidiary of BYJC, The Import & Export Corporation (IEC) conducts business to 
import and export on behalf of BYJC.  It seeks out trades on the principle of mutual benefits and seeks co-
developments worldwide.  This Corporation was awarded "Customs Worthy Enterprise” by customs. The main 
business activities of IEC are:  
 
 Import and export business of machine tools, such as machining centers, plano milling machines, CNC 
milling machines, conventional milling machines, and other electric and machinery products; Indirect 
export business through professional import and export corporations 
 Cooperative production projects 
 Machining according to drawings, samples, materials, Castings projects 
 Technical maintenance and services 
 Labor export and engineering contracting 
 
Since the beginning, the products have been sold by direct export or indirect export through professional 
import and export corporations and now reach more than 50 countries and regions, including the US, Germany, 
Japan, Iran, and Russia, and the products are widely acclaimed by users and traders worldwide.  In recent years, 
Beijing No. 1 Machine Tool Plant imported and adopted advanced technologies from developed countries through 
the IEC with the manufacturers and traders of Japan, the U.S.A., and Germany to co-produce CNC Lathe and CNC 
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milling machine (including CNC super heavy-duty plano-type milling & boring machines) to meet needs of overseas 
customers. And at the same time, BYJC undertook projects for machining to drawings, samples, and materials, and 
to provide castings and machined parts for domestic and international customers.   
 
FIELD RESEARCH RESULTS AND MODEL JUSTIFICATION 
 
The first moderating variable (γ) in the Caselli and Coleman (2001) model is the availability of expansion 
capital to the rate of new technology adoption.  Understanding this variable and its behavior is crucial since it is a 
cornerstone of technology adoption.  Our field research found this to be a major issue in China where the struggle 
between competing demands for expansion capital is acute.  The availability of capital is asymmetric (the diametric 
opposite of the assumptions of Caselli and Coleman) because the national government gives state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) preferential access to capital irrespective of industry.  Such preferential treatment was not uncommon during 
the transformation of other formerly planned economies (see, for example: Russia, See Brandt and Zhu, 1997 for a 
description of alternative approaches to SOE funding and the approach of the former Soviet Union).  Constraints of 
this nature keep the inefficient firms in business and prevent efficient firms from entering the market and/or 
competing successfully (Parente, 2008).  In China, for example, private firms encounter limited access to investment 
capital, and where such funds have been made available, were subject to significantly above-market interest rates 
(Linton, 2006).  The work of Overholt (2005) suggests that a politically motivated banking system can be seen as at 
least partially at fault.  Linton (2006) added credence to Overholt’s assertions noting that although small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs) produce more value to the economy in general, more funding is provided to SOEs 
by lenders and government appointees based on national development plans rather than on risk assessments or 
expected return on investments.  Similar asymmetries were observed by Oswald (2000) in the Czech Republic 
during the early days of its transitional economy.   
 
Today, debt capital in China is further restricted at the national level by an increase in banking reserve 
requirements and interest rate hikes (Forbes, 2007).  As summarized by Perkins (2006), in order to sustain the 
pattern of expansion in China, it will be necessary for the government to make the appropriate capital allocation 
decisions and assure that investments meet the collective interest. 
 
Another pressing government concern in China is employment levels.  Labor remains abundant and our 
research supports the belief that overexpansion of unproductive SOEs has helped to keep the lower skilled 
workforce employed.  Thus, there is political pressure to allocate resources based on employment needs rather than 
on productivity as would be the case in a truly competitive market.  On the other hand, a change in capital allocation 
to SMEs in search of new technologies would likely lead to efficiencies but lower levels of employment in the short 
run.  Such was experienced in China’s machine tool industry during earlier periods.  Today China is the world’s 
largest consumer of machine tools, buying at more than twice the rate of the U.S.  Foreign manufactured machines 
have traditionally captured a large portion of the Chinese market.  After experiencing a surge in the demand for 
imported machine tools from 1990-1996, the following year saw a deep decline because the Chinese Government 
cancelled tariff exemptions on imported capital equipment.  Predictably, demand for foreign-produced machine tools 
slowed drastically.  Then, at the start of 1998, the Chinese Government resumed tariff incentives and preferential 
treatment of imports of high technology and machine tools for foreign-funded projects.  China imported $688 M 
USD worth of machine tools in the first six months of 1998, up 9.77 percent from the previous year. Today, China’s 
consumption is nearly $13 billion US dollars.   
 
Proposition 1:  The likelihood of the technology adoption increases with the availability of expansion capital.  
 
Thus, unlike the assumptions advanced by Caselli and Coleman, in the Chinese marketplace, we can 
assume neither symmetric macro-environmental contexts nor perfect competition, but suspect that technology 
adoption decisions would generally follow the abundance of either skilled or less-skilled labor within the industry., 
As investment in human capital continues to increase at a rapid rate in China, the addition of skilled labor will likely 
bring with it an expansion of technology adoption.  As Perkins (op cit) observes: “the significance of this rapid 
expansion in education depends in part on what model of the relationship between education and economic growth 
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that you choose”.  Conventional growth accounting1 assumes that the contribution of an educated person can be 
measured by the difference between the wage of the educated person and the wage of an uneducated person. The 
assumption is that wage equals the marginal product of that laborer and, hence, the contribution of that laborer to 
GDP.  If one accepts these assumptions, then the contribution of China’s massive increase in the educational levels 
of its population likely contributed 1% or less to the growth rate of GDP in the past and will make a comparable or 
lesser contribution in the future as the rate of increase diminishes.   
 
An alternative model of the contribution of education to economic growth assumes that agglomeration 
effects result from the expansion of education (Dalmazzo & De Blasio, 2007).  Specifically, the assumption is that 
people learn from each other.  An educated population provides for increased learning both inside and outside the 
formal education system.  This relationship has long been recognized in the connection between the education of 
children and the educational level of their parents.  It also is present in the schools because a population with a large 
number of educated people is more likely to have qualified teachers than a population where most adults have had 
little more than a primary school education if that.  Agglomeration effects are likewise present in everyday life.  For 
example, an engineer working in isolation in a factory is likely to be much less effective than if that engineer was 
interacting with other engineers with similar or different experiences.  Clearly stated, it is the “knowledge spillover” 
that is created by the clustering of educated individuals.  Consequently, there appears to be good reason to think that 
the standard method used to account for education’s contribution to economic growth seriously understates that 
contribution particularly in developing countries such as China.  The previous argument suggests that China’s vast 
investment in human capital would correlated with increased technology adoption, thus, we posit the following: 
 
Proposition 2:  The technology adoption increases with the availability of skilled workers in the manufacturing 
industry. 
 
 Another influence important to the technological expansion in the Chinese market (έ) is the alignment of 
regional/local investment decisions with the national priorities.  Specifically, Chinese municipalities and regions 
have significant influence over factory managers with regard to staffing adjustments and can likewise impose 
constraints that may not be in the best interest of the national priorities.  For example, even is situations were the 
demand for goods is high and national government policy supports expansion, the priorities of municipal decision 
makers may impede the adoption decision making process.  As pointed out above, the pressure to retain or absorb a 
constant or growing workforce may work at odds with the pressure to improve methods and productivity through the 
acquisition of new capital assets.   Further, significant obstacles can emerge with respect to the access to capital 
since firms under the direct influence of local governments typically receive preferential access to equity markets to 
the detriment of those without powerful, local, connections (Green 2003). At the national level, counter-market 
impacts have resulted in asymmetric availability of capital, concomitant with and deteriorating confidence in the 
capital markets.  Consequently, capital alternatives are impacted (and often limited) at the firm level. Finally, as seen 
in other transitional economies (Oswald, 2000), municipalities or districts may control not only firm assets, and 
authority for new acquisitions, but may , hand out management responsibilities to “cronies” in return for political 
favors.  Given this, we posit: 
 
Proposition 3: The likelihood of the technology adoption increases with the alignment of local/regional priorities 
to those of the central government.   
 
Our final moderating variable (Ψ) captures the notion of the extent of management autonomy within firms.  
Autonomy here is defined as the right to prepare and execute capital and operating budgets, to employ and terminate 
staff, to adjust compensation, and to change working conditions consistent with market forces.  Such autonomy is 
generally representative of free markets, and, based on a cursory view of the technology adoption process in China 
tends to be the same.  However, particular to China is the concept of guanxi, the network of relationships between 
various parties that cooperate and support one another (exchange of favors), that flows through Chinese culture and 
influences decisions (Park and Luo, 2001).  In China business success is a function of aligning with the right guanxi.  
                                                 
1 Growth accounting is a procedure used in economics to measure the contribution of various factors to the economic growth .  It 
is indirectly used to compute the rate of technological progress.  For more information, see Robert Solow 1957 Technical change 
and the aggregate production function Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Aug., 1957), pp. 312-320 
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The correct guanxi can minimize risks, barriers, and start-up problems, and, if the guanxi has relevant authorities, 
can determine the long term competitive standing of an organization.  Consequently, the guanxi is essential to 
successful business practices.  As Alston (1989, pg 26) notes:  “Guanxi is one of the major dynamics in Chinese 
society.” The term refers to special relationships two persons have with each other. It can be best translated as 
friendship with overtones of unlimited exchange of favors and commitment to one another (Pye 1982), Whenever 
scarce resources exist in China, they are allocated by Guanxi rather than official or bureaucratic dictates. Within this 
context, Guanxi bonds two persons through the exchange of favors rather than through sentiment.  Instead, the 
relationship is basically utilitarian rather than emotional. The moral dimension operating here is that a person who 
does not follow a rule of equity and refuses to return favor for favor loses face and becomes defined as 
untrustworthy.”  Therefore, moderated by guanxi, managerial autonomy is assumed to be the variable most closely 
linking technology decisions to market forces.  Since the shift to uniform managerial autonomy has not occurred in 
China, we propose its inclusion in the model and posit: 
 
Proposition 4:  The likelihood of the technology adoption increases with the level of autonomy wielded by the 
firm’s management. 
 
Given the previous rationale we advance the following model for technology adoption (adapted from 
Caselli and Coleman (2001)), for the Chinese market,  
 
 
 
 
 
where 
it
mI  is machine tool imports per worker (in current U.S. dollars) in region i and year t . X
it
 is
 
the set of 
explanatory variables, δt is a set of year dummies, and uit is independently and identically distributed among regions 
and years.  All the variables included in the vector X
it 
 are measured annually.  The vector X
it 
is expected to conform 
to 
X it  α + γ + έ + Ψ 
 
where γ is the availability of expansion capital in light of the competitive demand from other industries deemed 
strategic for the region. 
 
So, έ is the alignment. 
 
 Solutions to expand the manufacturing base are short term in nature and not sustainable, consequently 
employment is a pressing concern yet labor is abundant.  As a quick fix, there has occurred a rapid overexpansion of 
local/regional versus national priorities on investment decisions.  And, Ψ is the extent of management autonomy in 
directing the produce and investment decisions of the firm.   
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
While SOEs still dominate the business landscape in China, many have changed their ownership structure 
through joint ventures or privatization.  This phenomenon, coupled with the rapid growth in FDI, has profoundly 
changed the face of the Chinese economy.  Beginning in1978, the Chinese central leadership began to carve a path 
toward a more market-oriented system, and by 2003,China stood (on a PPP basis) as the second-largest economy in 
the world behind the US (Congressional Research Service, 2008).  The observed process of an industrial giant 
migrating from a centrally planned economy with its inherent inefficiencies vis-à-vis a market economy is a 
dynamic one that has not yet been sufficiently described or evaluated by the existing literature.   
 
Beginning with the dominant emergent models of technology adoption and specifically the model advanced 
by Caselli and Coleman (2001), and supported by an in-depth study of the Chinese tool industry, this research 
provided evidence as to why existing models of technology adoption do not accurately fit the Chinese marketplace.  
Specifically, within a market economy, a firm naturally seeks efficiencies and in so doing acquires new technologies 
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to enhance its market position.  Such has not been the case in all industries in China.  Despite its unprecedented 
transformation including a move away from a centrally planned economy, and despite its encouragement of FDI, 
China’s national policies have served as impediments to market driven technology adoption.  In the present research 
we show, by example, that China’s technology adoption process does not conform to that observed in mature 
market-based economies.  We advanced the work of Caselli and Coleman’s (2001) by including three moderating 
variables to their model representative of the Chinese market.  These moderating variables are:  firm-level decision 
makers; municipal and regional-level decision makers, and state policymakers.  As evidence from central and 
eastern Europe (Oswald, 2000) transformation to a market-based economy does not occur overnight, nor does 
technology adoption come without its own share of problems (eg: Russia, Czech Republic).  We add to the literature 
by recognizing these differences in technology adoption and posit a separate model which suitably addresses these 
issues.  Further research should look at empirically testing the propositions and model advanced in this work.  In 
additional, further research should test the model on other countries that have or are transforming from a centrally 
planned economy. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Field Research Summary 
 
Our research involved extensive field studies of a very large machine tool firm located in the heart of Beijing, China.  
Beijing No.1 Machine Tool Plant (BYJC) is a large computer numerical control (CNC) machine tool manufacturing firm.  Since 
its founding in June, 1949, BYJC provided its customers with over 100,000 milling machines in over 450 varieties, including 
small and medium-sized, heavy-duty and super-heavy-duty.  ISO 9001 certified, the firm employed both engineers and 
technicians and occupies an area of 710,000 sq meters, including a 430,000 sq. meter building area.  Its production facility 
included a modern 4000-sq-meter air-conditioned assembly workshop, a 2000-sq-meter Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS) 
workshop, complete with advanced machining equipment, precision measuring instrumentation, and a 4896 position high-rack 
storehouse. 
 
The main products produced by BYJC are CNC milling machines, CNC lathes, vertical machining centers, horizontal 
machining centers and CNC plano-type milling & boring machines.  In addition, 20,000 geological rigs in more than 20 varieties 
have been manufactured and sold.  Products bearing the "Beiyi" brand enjoy a good reputation and are in use in over 50 
countries.  The establishment of an advanced information system on the computer network contributed to optimization of the 
enterprise's resources.  BYJC was awarded the "Industrial LEAD Award" issued by the Society of Manufacturing Engineers of 
the US.  This is the first time this award had been presented to a firm outside the U.S.   
 
Products 
 
BYJC’s products include:  
 
 Knee-type milling machines, universal milling machines and swivel head milling machines. 
 Bed-type milling machines and rotary table milling machines. 
 Plano milling machines, plano milling & boring machines, single column milling machines as well as double column 
milling machines. 
 CNC vertical milling machines. CNC plano milling machines and vertical or horizontal machining centers. 
 Several kinds of special-purpose milling machines. 
 Geological drills 
 
These products are used in metallurgy, mining, railway, power generation, aerospace and aircraft and mold 
manufacturing. The plant also produces geological rigs that are widely used in mine prospecting and development of water 
resources. 
 
Services  
 
Founded in 1988, The Import & Export Corporation (IEC), a subsidiary of BYJC, handles imports and exports for 
BYJC. It seeks out mutual benefit trades and co-developments worldwide. IEC received the "Customs Worthy Enterprise” award 
for its business activities which include:  
 
 Import and export of machine tools, such as machining centers, plano milling machines, CNC milling machines, 
conventional milling machines, and other electric and machinery products; Indirect export business through 
professional import and export corporations 
 Cooperative production projects 
 Machining according to drawings, samples, materials, Castings projects 
 Technical maintenance and services 
 Labor export and engineering contracting 
 
Since the beginning, the products have been sold by direct or indirect export through professional import and export 
corporations to more than 50 countries and regions, including the US, Germany, Japan, Iran, and Russia, and the products are 
widely acclaimed by users and traders worldwide.  In recent years, BYJC imported and adopted advanced technologies through 
the IEC from Japan, the U.S., and Germany to co-produce CNC Lathe and CNC milling machines (including CNC super heavy-
duty plano-type milling & boring machines).  
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Challenges Observed 
 
One of the challenges in the machine tool industry is globalization.  Among China’s SOEs the machine tool industry 
suffered most from operating losses.  The state opened the machine tool industry to the global market as early as 1994. Prior to 
that time, products from SOEs accounted for more than 70 percent of the domestic supply of machine tools.  Firms within China 
were immune to foreign competition.  However, when the purchase of machine tools no longer required government approval, 
foreign products flooded the market. Many such products had superior features, functions and quality than domestic products.  
Further, foreign products were offered at lower prices than those of Chinese manufacturers.  Since the Chinese government did 
not impose tariffs or taxes on imported machine tools, the domestic manufacturers found themselves without government 
protection and had to compete on equal ground with competitors from Japan, Germany, U.S., Korea and Taiwan. The flood of 
foreign technologies and products has dramatically changed the competitive terrain.  All the firms in this industry have been 
impacted significantly by China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO Managers inside BYJC advocated adoption 
of many new technologies as an immediate response.  Today BYJC operates in a highly competitive market. 
 
Product Challenges 
 
Although government officials acknowledge the machine tool industry, and machine tool manufacturing as core 
industries, from 1976 to 1997, no advanced systems were implemented (the government invested only $37 million in the 
industry) and there emerged a wide technology gap between China and the rest of the world.  Since 1999, the government has 
established four numerical control machine production bases, which consists of BYJC, Shanghai Machine Tool Group, Shenyang 
Machine Tool Group and Jinan Machine Tool Group.  However, these significant investments fall short of the amount necessary 
to keep pace.  Another challenge for BYJC is its sales force, which has yet to grasp the concept of marketing.  Under the former 
economic planning system, the state disposed of finished products and dictated production expectations.  Thus, the sales force has 
no clear idea of how the product can be promoted and sold in the marketplace. High sales costs and long sales cycle times have 
turned many customers toward foreign competitors, not solely because of their dissatisfaction with the quality and price of the 
products, but also because the sales force lacks the requisite knowledge.  
 
Another challenge for BYCJ centers on the necessary facilities and technology for producing advanced machine tools.  
For example, product development was severely constrained due to the lack of investment capital.  Most of the production 
equipment in the BYJC’s plant was purchased prior to 1970.  The implication was that without significant new technology, the 
domestic supply of machine tools could permanently lag behind foreign competitors.  
 
Challenges To Reorganization 
 
SOEs are often characterized by awkward organizational structures. On one hand, the plant owns everything in its 
value chain, from casting, forging, and machining to assembly, which has resulted in compromised efficiency.  On the other 
hand, plant management has broad authority over its workforce.  BYJC provides a wide array of benefits to its employees 
including primary and secondary schools, and dining facilities.  Of course, with this power come significant expectations limiting 
autonomy regarding the number of workers.  Whatever control managers have over the workforce is overshadowed by their 
inability to upgrade technologically. 
 
Challenges In Motivation  
 
Employee retention and motivation was also a challenge. The annual turnover rate for junior technical staff was as high 
as 70 percent.  The plant is an excellent learning facility for new graduates; however, within three years, most become experts 
and leave for the private sector and higher salaries (more than four times higher).  There is a significant depletion of technical 
talent from joint venture competitors because SOEs can’t pay market salaries.  As is the case with most SOEs, BYCI was 
overstaffed, causing inefficiencies in production.  These problems could be handled with the addition of new technologies by 
external forces have inhibited progress. 
 
Control Challenges 
 
Even though 100 percent of the plant assets belong to the state, there was a lack of clear indication as to who actually 
was in charge.  The Beijing Machine and Electronic Holdings Co. (BMEHC) selected the plant’s general manager and approved 
managerial appointments but often the directives came from the Beijing Municipality government.  An example of unclear lines 
of authority occurred when a detailed modernization plan was proposed.  The plan, which was to have cost $120.500 USD was 
rejected by the Beijing local authority because it lacked “Chinese characteristics”.  So, while the plant management had operating 
rights, but did not control its corporate property or investments, which limited their ability to compete effectively in the global 
marketplace.  
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Strategic Responses Observed 
 
Property Rights Solution  
 
In December of 2000, the Beijing local authority (as distinguished from the Chinese Government) changed property 
rights for all state-owned assets.  BMEHC would be given the full authorization to take charge of the assets of BYJC. The 
restructuring plan was for BYJC to become the Machine Tool Group.  The ownership for this group would be such that BMEHC 
would be the biggest shareholder representing the state assets, but the rest would be opened to private investors, other domestic 
firms and foreign investors.  
 
The Machine Tool Group was to be run according to the Chinese Corporate Law.  A board of directors was selected to 
oversee the group.  While it was estimated that it would take several more years to complete a restructuring plan, the new 
ownership structure allowed BYJC to work toward competitiveness.  Part of this was to change the internal organizational 
structure such that subsidiaries that were not strategically important to BYJC would be spun off.   
 
Employee Obligations 
 
Machine tool plants in the developed countries usually have around 200 people but can produce several thousand 
machines each year. Since 1993, the staff of BYJC has been reduced from 9,700 to 4,000.  Reductions to 2,000 were planned as a 
part of the restructuring which was completed in 2007.  BYJC paid for helping displaced workers by providing training and lump 
sum of benefits for their severance and resettlement.  Under the newly restructured company, employees would work on contract 
basis and, the company would contribute for medical insurance and pension benefits. Most senior technical staff remained with 
the company.  BYJC is negotiating salaries to improve the living conditions; yet pay for senior technical staff remained 
significantly below the going market price.  
 
Product Developments 
 
BYJC has worked to upgrade its machine tool products since high-tech manufacturing systems was still restricted from 
entering the Chinese market.  For the last six years, regulatory restrictions have allowed BYJC to withstand fierce competitive 
pressure.  The plant has heavily invested in development of new products.  The plant has purchased advanced production systems 
and blueprints from Japan, Germany and the US in an attempt to use their advanced techniques to build dominance in the Chinese 
machine tool industry. 
 
Training 
 
BYJC has also expanded training for its technical staff.  Several classes in cooperation with universities are underway 
to prepare for computer integrating manufacturing.  The plant has a plan to send many of its key employees abroad to learn the 
rules of the internationally competitive game.   
 
Product Development 
 
BYJC has formed relationships with universities. For example, the plant has benefited from the computer integrating 
manufacturing system (CIMS) at Tsinghua University.  BYJC constantly introduces and applies world advanced technology and 
has established cooperative relationships with manufacturers in Japan, the United States, and Germany to produce machine 
centers and CN super-heavy-duty plano-type milling machines.    
 
Capital Investment 
 
Before BYJC’s stock could be publicly traded, the plant needed to maximize return on its property.  BYJC had an offer 
of $204 million USD for its land, and planned to move the plant outside Beijing to an economic development zone.  This money 
from a sale would be sufficient to finance the first phase of restructuring before its public offering. 
 
Managerial Autonomy 
 
In order to improve the management of the enterprise and meet the needs of a market economy, an enterprise 
management information system was installed. The enterprise management information system (EMIS) provided manufacturing 
resource planning including scheduling the production process from raw material, manufacturing, to assembly. 
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Product Developments 
 
BYJC’s product structure was changed to apply computer numerical control system (CNC) to compete effectively on 
the global market.  A high-level computer numerical control horizontal machining center model HB 500, cooperatively produced 
by BYJC and HITACHI SEIKI Co., Ltd. of Japan, was introduced at the "China CNC Machine Tool Show" in Shanghai in 
August 2000. The CNC bed-type series milling machines developed by BYJC were introduced at "the 5th China Machine Tool 
Show" in Beijing in June 2000. The machine features high carrying capacity, high torque, high efficiency and high performance. 
It is designed for die & moulds machining and has a competitive price point.  
